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Abstract We consider a sequential two-party bargaining game with uncertain information
transmission.Whentheﬁrstmoverstatesherdemandshedoesonlyknowtheprobabilitywith
which the second mover will be informed about it. The informed second mover can either
acceptorrejecttheofferandpayoffsaredeterminedasintheultimatumgame.Otherwisethe
uninformed second mover states his own demand and payoffs are determined as in the Nash
demand game. In the experiment we vary the commonly known probability of information
transmission.Ourmainﬁndingisthatﬁrstmovers’anduninformedsecondmovers’demands
adjust to this probability as qualitatively predicted, that is, ﬁrst movers’ (uninformed second
movers’) demands are lower (higher) the lower the probability of information transmission.
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That commitment confers a strategic advantage has inﬂuenced many areas of economic
theory like macroeconomics, international trade and industrial organization. If there is a
ﬁrst mover advantage, the necessary conditions for a commitment are its irreversibility and
that it can be reliably communicated.1 Both assumptions are granted in most leader-follower
modelsineconomicliterature.Recently,therobustnessofpreemptivecommitmentshasbeen
reviewedinthepresenceofimperfectobservabilityorerror-proneinformationtransmission.2
In an experimental analysis of a 2 × 2 game with full-support noise Huck and M¨ uller
(2000) ﬁnd that followers ignore small levels of noise and play a best-response against
the observed leader’s action even though with some probability this might be the “wrong”
action. Leaders quickly learn to exploit this tendency and play the Stackelberg leader’s
quantity. Only with high levels of noise, play converges to the Cournot equilibrium. G¨ uth et
al.(2001)experimentallyexaminethestrategicbehaviorofleadersandfollowersinsequential
duopolymarketsassuming,likeChakravortiandSpiegel(1993),thatfollowerseitherobserve
quantities of the leaders or nothing at all. Consistent with theory, leaders enjoy a greater ﬁrst-
mover advantage when followers observe their actions with higher probability.
In this paper we theoretically and experimentally investigate uncertain communication in
the ultimatum game. More precisely, the rules of the game are as follows: First, the proposer
X (or ﬁrst mover) states her demand x about which the responder (or second mover) then
receivesan“all-or-nothing” signal.Thatis,withacommonlyknownprobabilitywthesecond
mover Y learns the ﬁrst mover’s demand and with complementary probability the responder
receives no information at all.3 The informed second mover chooses between accepting or
rejecting the implicit offer. Accepting yields x to X and the difference between the total
available ‘pie,’ p, and x, i.e. (p − x)t oY. Rejecting the offer yields zero payoff for both.
The uninformed second mover states his own demand y and payoffs are then determined as
in the usual demand game (Nash, 1950). That is, if the sum of the two demands does not
exceed the pie (x + y ≤ p), both players receive their demands; otherwise (x + y > p) both
receive nothing. The reason for linking the ultimatum game and the demand game is that
both rely on single choices by both parties. This allows for an easy transition from one game
to the other and an easy description of the intermediate games.
The solution of this game—based on the notion of risk dominance (Harsanyi and Selten,
1988)—prescribesacontinuoustransitionfromtheultimatumbargainingtotheNashdemand
game: As the probability w decreases from 1 to 0, the risk dominant ﬁrst mover demand
decreasescontinuouslyfrom x = p to x = p/2,withthe(un)informedsecondmoveralways
(demanding) accepting the residual (p − x).




perfectly observable. This can clarify the robustness of results that were derived in the exten-
sivetheoreticalliteraturethatstudiedtheroleofcommitmentinsequentialgamesandindicate
how appropriate these bench-mark solutions are in the presence of imperfect communication
1 To come back brieﬂy to the above example: To burn the ships is clearly an irreversible action and one can
assume that both the English and William’s men did observe this action and understood its signiﬁcance.
2 Van Damme and Hurkens (1997) distinguish between errors in perception and errors in communication.
Bagwell (1995) investigates a model with errors in perception. Chakravorti and Spiegel (1993), on the other
hand, investigate a model with errors in communication.
3 Note that this signal technology is widely used in the literature, e.g., Rubinstein (1989), Fershtman et al.
(1991), Laffont and Tirole (1993), and Chakravorti and Spiegel (1993).
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channels. In spite of many experimental studies of bargaining and negotiations4 we are not
aware of studies investigating uncertain information transmission in a bargaining situation.
Our experiment employs a within-subject design regarding the probability w with which
the second mover is informed. In each of the 5 sessions subjects either acted in the role of
the ﬁrst or second mover and were repeatedly and randomly re-matched to play the game. In
each of the 60 rounds the probability w with which the second mover received a signal was
randomly and independently drawn for each pair of players from the set {0.1, 0.3, 0.7, 0.9}.
Our main ﬁnding is that ﬁrst movers’ (uninformed second movers’) average demands
weaklyincrease(decrease)withtheprobabilityw oftheultimatummode.However,demands
do not signiﬁcantly differ for the two small levels of w.In all treatment conditions, the mode
of behavior is the equal-split demand. In general, ﬁrst movers’ (uninformed second movers’)
demands decrease (increase) as sessions progressed. Finally, there are no direct effects of the
probability w on rejection behavior of informed second movers.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we precisely state the model and derive
the game-theoretic predictions. In Section 3 we describe our experimental design and the
procedures used. The results of the experiments are then presented in Section 4. Finally,
Section 5 offers a discussion of our results and some concluding remarks.
2. Theory
2.1. The model
Therearetwoparties:aﬁrstmover X andasecondmoverY whocandivideapositiveamount
of money p(> 0) among themselves. The timing of decisions is as follows: First X states her
demand x with 0 ≤ x ≤ p. This demand x is revealed to Y with probability w ∈ [0,1]. With
complementary probability 1 − w the decision x is not revealed to Y (who in this case only
knowsthat X hasalreadystatedherdemandx).Theprobabilitywiscommonlyknown.When
thesecondmoverY isinformedaboutplayer X’sdemand x,hecanchoosebetween“accept-
ing” or “rejecting” X’s demand and the implicit offer p − x.I fY accepts, player X earns x
whileplayerY earns y = p − x.IncaseY isnotinformedaboutplayer X’sdemand,hemust
state his own demand y with 0 ≤ y ≤ p. If the outcome is feasible, i.e. x + y ≤ p, both get
what they demanded (i.e. player X earns x and Y earns y). If x + y > p, both earn nothing.
Thus, if the second mover is informed about the ﬁrst mover demand, the rules are those of
the ultimatum game. Therefore, we will refer to this case as the U-mode. If the second mover
is not informed about the ﬁrst mover demand, the rules resemble those of the symmetric
Nash demand game with a positional order protocol.5 Therefore, we will refer to this case as
the N-mode. For any w ∈ (0,1) we refer to the game with this parameter w as the w-game.
2.2. Solution
We assume players to be selﬁsh proﬁt maximizers and this is commonly known. For the
U-mode any weakly undominated response function has to accept all positive offers. Since
for continuous offers y(x) = p − x there exists no smallest positive offer, we assume that
the demand x = p is also accepted. The decision problem of Y in case of a given and known
ﬁrst mover demand x can be substituted by its solution outcome (x, y) with y = p − x. This
4 For reviews see for example G¨ uth (1995) or Roth (1995).
5 Thepositionalorderprotocolreliesonsequentialdecisionswithoutrevealingearliermovestosecondmovers
(see Rapoport, 1997).
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substitution yields a game which is called the N-truncation. The rules of the N-truncation are
that with probability w the demand x by X is automatically accepted leading to payoff x for
X and y = p − x for Y. With complementary probability 1 − w the demands x by X and y
by Y lead to the payoff vector (x, y) only when x + y ≤ p. In conﬂict (x + y > p) it leads
to a payoff of 0 for both.
In the N-mode any strict equilibrium x∗(w) with 0 < x∗(w) < p requires the best re-
sponse y∗(w) = p − x∗(w). As a consequence, all demand vectors (x, y) with x + y = p
are equilibria of the N-truncation which are even strict (one loses by deviating unilaterally)
in case of x, y > 0. When solving N-truncations we therefore rely on equilibrium selection.
Morespeciﬁcally,wediscriminateamongsolutioncandidates(thestrictequilibria)byrisk
dominance.6 Risk dominance (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988) is usually an intransitive relation.
When solving N–truncations, this problem does not arise, however, since N-truncations have
a unique strict equilibrium that risk-dominates all other strict equilibria. In our view, this
renders risk dominance more intuitive and possibly behaviorally attractive.7 Relying on risk
dominance, we can prove (see Appendix A):
Proposition 1. The risk dominant solution of the N-truncations with parameter w ∈ [0,1]





The solution of w-games is the solution of the N-truncations (given in Proposition 1)
together with the best-response function (i.e., universal acceptance of all offers in the U-
mode) underlying the deﬁnition of N-truncations. That is, given probability w, the ﬁrst
mover will demand x∗(w), the uninformed second mover will demand y∗(w) = p − x∗(w)








for w → 0 (N-mode for certain)
p for w → 1 (U-mode for certain),
the outcome of the w-games moves monotonically from the outcome of the Nash demand
game (x∗(0) = p/2) to the one of ultimatum bargaining (x∗(1) = p). We thus have naturally
linked the two prominent bargaining models by w-games.
3. Experimental design
The computerized experiments were conducted at Humboldt University Berlin using the
software tool kit z-Tree (Fischbacher, 1999). We ran 5 sessions with 12 subjects each. With a
few exceptions, subjects were students of economics or business administration at Humboldt
University. They were either randomly recruited from a pool of potential participants or
6 Payoffdominancedoesnotallowfordiscriminationamongstrictequilibriainourgame(seealsofootnote7).
7 Theoretical support for risk dominance is provided, e.g., in Harsanyi (1995), Kandori, Mailath and Rob
(1993) and Young (1993). Evidence for the behavioral relevance of risk dominance is documented, e.g., in
Van Huyck, et al. (1990, 1991), Straub (1995), Charness (2000) and Cabrales et al. (2000).
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invitedbyleaﬂetsdistributedaroundtheuniversitycampus.Sessionslastedabout45minutes.
The average earnings were EUR 12.88.8
Uponarrivalinthelaboratory,eachsubjectwasseatedinfrontofacomputerscreenwhere
she received written instructions in German.9 After reading the instructions, subjects were
allowed to ask clarifying questions which were answered privately. Instructions informed
subjects that there were two roles (role X and role Y) and that in each session 6 subjects were
randomlyassignedtotherole X and6subjectstotheroleY.Roleswerekeptﬁxedduringthe
entiresession.Weimplementedthew-gamedescribedabovewithfourdifferentprobabilities
w in a within-subject design.10 The payoffs were denoted in ECU (Experimental Currency
Unit) and subjects were informed that 200 ECU would pay 1 EUR at the end of the session.
The available amount p was equal to 100 ECU in each round. In each of the 60 rounds one
X was randomly matched with one Y and the computer randomly selected one of the four
probabilitiesw ∈ {0.1,0.3,0.7,0.9}independentlyforeachofthesix X/Y-pairs.11 Eachpair
was informed about the selected value of w.12 The computer also selected the mode (U- or
N-mode)accordingtothechosenprobabilityw independentlyforeachpair.Thenthesubject
acting in role X, knowing only probability w but not the selected mode, stated her integer
demand x with 0 ≤ x ≤ 100. The round then continued depending on the selected mode.
IncaseoftheU-mode(“mode1”),participantY learnedtheactualdemandx of X andthen
decidedbetween“accepting” or“rejecting” it.IncaseoftheN-mode(“mode2”),participant
Y was not informed about x before stating his own integer demand y with 0 ≤ y ≤ 100. Y
only knew that “X had just stated his demand”. Payoffs were then determined according to
the respective payoff rule, described in Section 2.1. At the end of each round, each X/Y pair
was informed about the random draws made by the computer and the individual decisions
made in this round. Furthermore, every participant was informed about his own individual
payoff in that round.
Therelativelyhighnumberof60roundsgavesubjectsampleopportunityforlearningand
provided many (although not independent) observations for (un)informed second movers in
all treatment conditions. The random matching scheme was employed to weaken possible
repeated game effects.
4. Experimental results
4.1. Descriptive data analysis
In this subsection we ﬁrst present some relevant summary statistics. Later in Sections 4.2 to
4.4 we analyze ﬁrst and second mover behavior in more detail using regression techniques.
8 Average earnings of ﬁrst movers were EUR 13.56 with standard deviation 1.07 and average earnings of
second movers were EUR 12.22 with standard deviation 1.08.
9 An English translation of the instructions can be downloaded at: http://center.uvt.nl/staff/muller/Inst-
ructions From Ulimatum to Nash.pdf.
10 A within-subject design allows to explore the sensitivity to w-changes on an individual level rather than via
a comparison of different groups of participants whose composition might vary in some rather uncontrolled
way. (See also Morgan and Vardy (2004) who use a very similar design.)
11 This deﬁnitely discourages to develop habits for a given w-value but should induce participants to pay
attention to the speciﬁc realization of w.
12 The “extreme” probabilities (w = 0.1 and w = 0.9) were used in order to see whether behavior approx-
imates the usual ﬁndings for the boundary cases w = 0, respectively w = 1. The intermediate probabilities
(w = 0.3 and w = 0.7) allow to test the sensitivity of behavior to w-changes, both in the lower and the upper
w-range.
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Table 1 Risk dominant solution demands and observed average demands over all rounds
Second movers
First movers N-mode U-mode
Probability x∗(w) Mean x(w) y∗(w) Mean y(w) Conﬂict rate Rejection rate
w = 0.9 90.91 58.61 9.09 44.90 42.85% 22.11%
(N = 456) – (3.12) – (4.38) (21/49) (90/407)
w = 0.7 76.92 55.66 23.08 47.84 38.06% 11.31%
(N = 470) – (2.86) – (2.35) (51/134) (38/336)
w = 0.3 58.82 50.50 41.18 48.99 5.37% 0.009%
(N = 466) – (0.65) – (0.88) (19/354) (1/112)
w = 0.1 52.63 50.32 47.37 49.53 6.78% 0%
(N = 408) – (0.53) – (0.55) (25/369) (0/39)
Total N 1800 906 894
Note. Standard deviations based on session averages appear in parentheses.
With 5 sessions of 60 rounds each, and 6 leaders and 6 followers in each session, we have a
total of 1800 decisions for each role. Second movers were informed about x (U-mode) 894
times and remained uninformed (N-mode) in 906 encounters.
Table 1 reports summary statistics separately for the four different probabilities w ∈
{0.1,0.3,0.7,0.9}. For ﬁrst movers it reports predicted demands x∗(w), average observed
demands x(w) along with standard deviations (in parentheses). For second movers Table 1
distinguishes between the Nash demand (N) and the ultimatum (U) mode. In case of the
N-mode it reports the predicted demand y∗(w), average observed demands y(w) along with
standard deviations and the conﬂict rates, i.e. the relative frequency of cases with x(w) +
y(w) > 100. For the U-mode it only reports rejection rates. As there is no case in which
a ﬁrst mover demanded the whole pie, the theoretical rejection rate is zero in all cases.
The information given in Table 1 is complemented by ﬁgures 1 and 2 which illustrate the
frequency distributions of ﬁrst movers’ and uninformed second movers’ demands.
What are the main effects? Consider ﬁrst-mover behavior and refer to Table 1. Average
demands of ﬁrst movers vary monotonically with w but much less than predicted (for a
more detailed graphical illustration see ﬁgures 1 and 2). There is only a negligible difference
between average demands for w = 0.3 and w = 0.1 (50.50 vs. 50.32). Average demands be-
tweenw = 0.9andw = 0.7varyconsiderablymore(58.61vs.55.66).Thelargestdifference
canbeobservedbetweenw = 0.7andw = 0.3(55.66vs.50.50).Overall,ﬁrstmoversdonot
sharply differentiate when the level of w is small (w ≤ 0.3) and mostly offer to split the pie
equallyinthesecaseswhatexplainstheverylowconﬂictrates(5.37%,respectively6.78%in
case of the N-mode and 0.009%, respectively 0% in case of the U-mode). Furthermore, it is
interestingtonotethatbehaviorislessdispersedthelowertheprobabilityw oftheultimatum
mode as shown by the standard deviations of ﬁrst and second mover demands.
Also with regard to uninformed second-mover demands (N-mode), we observe that the
comparative statics properties regarding w are reﬂected in the data (although, again, not as
pronounced as predicted). Average demands increase from 44.90 in case of w = 0.9 to 49.53
in case of w = 0.1. However, again average demands differ only slightly between w = 0.1
and w = 0.3 (49.53 vs. 48.99).
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Fig. 1 Frequency distribution of ﬁrst movers’ demands (all rounds)
The histograms in ﬁgures 1 and 2 show relative frequencies of demands of ﬁrst and
uninformed second movers for each value of w separately. In both roles, demanding ex-
actly 50 is the mode for each level of w. Though this is generally true for all w’s and
both roles, for ﬁrst movers the pure dominance of this mode for the two higher levels of
w is less pronounced than for second movers what also explains the high conﬂict rates for
higher w-values (w ≥ 0.7). The equal split is also the median demand of uninformed sec-
ond movers for all w-values and of ﬁrst movers for all given w-values strictly smaller than
0.9. (For w = 0.9 the median is 60.) The distributions of both, ﬁrst and uninformed second
mover demands are more dispersed for higher levels of probability w. But it is not sym-





rejection rates increase monotonically with w. Due to different numbers of observations, it
is difﬁcult to compare conﬂict/rejection rates between the U- and the N-mode for each w.
Nevertheless it is worth mentioning that in the N-mode the increase in conﬂict rates is more
pronounced than that in rejection rates in the U-mode where subjects know the exact costs
of choosing conﬂict.
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Fig. 2 Frequency distribution of uninformed second movers’ demands (all rounds)
4.2. Analysis of ﬁrst-mover behavior
When ﬁrst movers state their demands, they only know the probability w with which the
second mover will be informed about their demand. As the control variable w was truly
exogenous, random-effects regression models seem to be the most appropriate ones.13
Inordertoassessleaders’behavior,weestimatedseveralversionsofthefollowingrandom-
effects model:
xit = α0 + α7D7 + α3D3 + α1D1 + β9(D9 × t) + β7(D7 × t)
+β3(D3 × t) + β1(D1 × t) + δcConﬂictt−1 + ci + uit, (1)
where xit isleaderi’sdemandinroundt andvit = ci + uit isacompositeerrortermwiththe
usualassumptionsmadeinrandomeffectsregressionmodels. Dk isadummyvariablewhich
isequalto1ifsubjectsconfrontedaprobabilityoftheU-modeofw = k/10(k ∈{ 1,3,7})and
0 otherwise. Thus, the behavior under treatment condition w = 0.9 serves as the reference
13 A Breusch-Pagan LM test was used to test for the necessity of subject effects and a Hausman test was
applied to test for differences between the ﬁxed-effects and the random-effects model. In all regressions,
a panel regression with subject effects was preferable to a classic regression model and among the panel
regression models a random-effects model was preferrable to a ﬁxed-effects model.
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Table 2 Results of ﬁrst-mover regressions
Regression Regression Regression Regression
FM1 FM2 FM3 FM4
α0 58.997∗∗∗ 60.933∗∗∗ 62.486∗∗∗ 62.422∗∗∗
(0.557) (0.594) (0.683) (0.722)
α7 (D7) −3.194∗∗∗ −3.175∗∗∗ −3.946∗∗∗ −3.791∗∗∗
(0.337) (0.330) (0.645) (0.643)
α3 (D3) −8.288∗∗∗ −8.386∗∗∗ −10.998∗∗∗ −10.691∗∗∗
(0.386) (0.377) (0.674) (0.786)
α1 (D1) −8.446∗∗∗ −8.520∗∗∗ −11.570∗∗∗ −11.103∗∗∗
(0.417) (0.408) (0.710) (0.705)
β0 (t) −0.061∗∗∗
(0.007)
β9 (D9 × t) −0.110∗∗∗ −0.104∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013)
β7 (D7 × t) −0.085∗∗∗ −0.083∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013)
β3 (D3 × t) −0.025∗ −0.026∗∗
(0.013) (0.013)




Adj. pseudo R2 0.240 0.259 0.263 0.300
Note: Standard errors of estimators in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p <. 05,
∗∗∗p <. 01.
case. The variable t = 1,...,60 indexes the rounds. Finally, Conﬂictt−1 is a one-period
lagged dummy variable that is equal to 1 if in the preceding round a demand was rejected
in the U-mode or play resulted in conﬂict in the N-mode, and is equal to 0 otherwise.
All ﬁrst-mover regressions were adjusted for heteroscedasticity.14 The results of ﬁrst-mover
regressions are presented in Table 2. Regressions FM1–FM4 differ in terms of independent
variables that were included.
Considering ﬁrst the effect of probability w on ﬁrst mover demands, regressions FM1-
FM4 show that without exception the coefﬁcients of the treatment dummies are negative
and highly signiﬁcant (with 0 >α 7 >α 3 >α 1). Hence demands are signiﬁcantly smaller
than for the reference case of w = 0.9. Furthermore, in all four regressions the restriction
α7 = α3 must be rejected whereas the restriction α3 = α1 can not be rejected.15 Thus ﬁrst
moversdonotreacttochangesinw ifthelevelofw isrelativelysmall(w ≤ 0.3).Butforhigh
probabilities of the U-mode, statistically signiﬁcant reactions can be measured which are in
line with our qualitative predictions. From Table 1 we already concluded that ﬁrst movers
tended to demand less than what is prescribed by the theory. The results of regressions FM2
14 A Breusch Pagan test for heteroscedasticity revealed heteroscedasticity between sessions for ﬁrst-mover
data.
15 If not explicitly mentioned, signiﬁcance levels in hypothesis tests are set equal to p ≤ 5%.
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Table 3 Identiﬁed individual patterns of ﬁrst movers’ demands
Number of cases (percentage)






























0.1 – 1 ( 3.3) –
Other 1 ( 3.3) 3 (10.0) 2 ( 6.7)
Total 30 (100) 30 (100) 30 (100)
Note: xm
w stands for individual median demands at given w-levels.
and FM4 imply that this tendency became stronger as sessions progressed. Regression FM2
shows that there is a negative and signiﬁcant effect (β0 =− 0.061∗∗) of time across all treat-
ment conditions. Regression FM 3 and FM4 measure time effects for each of the treatment
conditions separately. Since β9 <β 7 <β 3 <β 1 < 0, we see that the magnitude of this ef-
fect monotonically varies with the probability of the ultimatum mode. Note that one must
(separately) reject the restrictions β9 = β7 and β7 = β3 and that β1 is insigniﬁcant. Finally,
since the coefﬁcient δc is small in magnitude and statistically insigniﬁcant, we conclude that
conﬂict(N-mode)orrejectionofanoffer(U-mode)intheprecedingroundhasnoimmediate
effect on ﬁrst mover behavior.16
We also analyzed individual patterns of ﬁrst movers’ median demands. We identiﬁed 6
monotone patterns which are shown in the ﬁrst column in Table 3. In this Table, xm
w denotes
an individual’s median demand for a given value of w. We categorize individual behavior
separately for all rounds (column 2), the ﬁrst 20 rounds (column 3) and the last 20 rounds
(columns 4).
Consider, for example, column 2 in Table 3 counting patterns with regard to all rounds.
Nine subjects (30%) have median demands that are identical for all w’s. As it turns out,
all median demands of these subjects are the equal split. Another 8 subjects (27%) only
differentiate between the two high values of w and display the same median demand for
all other probabilities. The next 6 subjects (20%) only have two different median demands:
one for the two high probabilities and a lower one for the two small probabilities. Another
6 subjects have 3 different median demands. They appear to treat the two low probabilities
alike. The one subject appearing in category “other” in Table 3 states median demands that
monotonically increase with a decreasing probability w. Note that for no subject median
demands decreased with a falling probability w in a strictly monotonic way as predicted by





is a shift towards more w-invariant equal-split demands. Their share increases from 20% to
about 43%.
16 We tested for autocorrelation in residuals in model FM4 but didn’t ﬁnd any evidence for it.
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Observation 1. The behavior of ﬁrst movers can be summarized as follows:
(i) Average demands (weakly) increase with the probability w of the ultimatum mode.
However, demands do not differ signiﬁcantly for the two small levels of w.
(ii) Inalltreatmentconditions,theequal-splitdemandconstitutesthemode.Moreover,about
30% of all subjects tend to state w-invariant demands.
(iii) On average, ﬁrst movers demand less than suggested by the risk dominant solution in all
treatmentconditions.Thisdeviationishigherthehighertheprobabilityoftheultimatum
mode.
(iv) First mover demands decrease as sessions progressed. This effect is more pronounced
thehighertheprobabilityoftheultimatummode.Also,theshareofequal-splitdemands
increased over time.
4.3. Analysis of uninformed second-mover behavior
We now turn to the behavior of uninformed second movers, i.e., of second movers facing
the Nash demand mode (N). In this case, second movers were asked to state their demand
y(w) being only aware of probability 1 − w by which ﬁrst movers expected the N-mode.
We estimated random-effects models that were similar to the ones we estimated for ﬁrst
movers (see Eq. (1)), except for the fact that for second movers no adjustment for het-
eroscedasticity was necessary. The results of second-mover regressions are presented in Ta-
ble 4. Regressions USM1-USM4 only differ in terms of the independent variables that were
included.
Considering ﬁrst the effect of the probability w on uninformed second movers’ behavior,
regressions USM1 and USM2 show that without exception the coefﬁcients of the treatment
dummiesarepositiveandsigniﬁcant(withα7 <α 3 <α 1).Whilethehypothesisthatα7 = α3
can be rejected, the hypothesis that α3 = α1 can not. Hence parallel to our ﬁndings about
ﬁrst-moverdemands,thetwosmallprobabilitiesofinformationtransmissionaretreatedalike
whereas in the range of higher levels of w, participants are more sensitive to w. Regression
USM2 shows that there is a small but highly signiﬁcant time effect across all treatment
conditions as β0 = 0.03. Regression USM3 (and also USM4) measures time effects for each
ofthetreatmentconditionsseparately.Asitturnsout,whileinsomecasesthereisasigniﬁcant
combined effect of time and treatment condition, in other cases there is none. Finally, we
note that the coefﬁcient δc is again statistically insigniﬁcant (see USM4).17
Also for uninformed second movers we identiﬁed individual patterns of median demands.
TheresultsaresummarizedinTable5.Duetotheall-or-nothingsignaltechnologyexploredin
this experiment, there are some subjects for which we do not have any observation for higher
probabilities (w = 0.7 or more often w = 0.9). In these cases we base our categorization on
the available observations. This is indicated in Table 5 by writing {ym
0.9 or ym
0.7}.18
Demanding 50 reﬂects in almost all cases individual median behavior at w = 0.1 and
w = 0.3. For example, regarding behavior in all rounds, for 28 out of 30 uninformed second
movers the median demand at the two smaller w-values is 50. Also with respect to all
rounds, the rate of uninformed second movers who show invariance in their median demands
17 We tested for autocorrelation in residuals in model USM4 but didn’t ﬁnd any evidence for it.
18 This means that sometimes the comparison is made only to observations for w = 0.9 in case an observation
for w = 0.7 is missing and vice versa. Furthermore, for some of the subjects we only have data for w = 0.1
and w = 0.3 or only for w = 0.1 and w = 0.7 for the ﬁrst respectively the last 20 rounds (see third to last row
in Table 4).
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Table 4 Results of uninformed second-mover regressions
Regression Regression Regression Regression
USM1 USM2 USM3 USM4
α0 44.701∗∗∗ 43.807∗∗∗ 46.7510∗∗∗ 47.265∗∗∗
(0.622) (0.657) (1.278) (1.306)
α7 (D7)3 .244∗∗∗ 3.138∗∗∗ 0.938 0.857
(0.633) (0.629) (1.435) (1.430)
α3 (D3)4 .292∗∗∗ 4.292∗∗∗ 0.431 0.233
(0.576) (.571) (1.303) (1.306)
α1 (D1)4 .806∗∗∗ 4.781∗∗∗ 2.159∗ 2.208∗
(0.575) (0.570) (1.308) (1.307)
β0 (t)0 .030∗∗∗
(.007)
β9 (D9 × t) −0.069∗ −0.069∗
(0.038) (0.037)
β7 (D7 × t)0 .008 0.010
(0.019) (0.019)
β3 (D3 × t)0 .060∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012)




Adj. pseudo R2 0.065 0.079 0.090 0.110
Note: Standard errors of estimators in parentheses; ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗∗p <. 01.
Table 5 Identiﬁed individual patterns of uninformed second movers’ demands
Number of cases (percentage)


















































0.1 – 4(13.3) 3 ( 10.0)
Other 1 (3.3) 7 (23.3) –
Total 30 (100) 30 (100) 30 (100)
Note: ym
w stands for individual median demands at given w-levels.
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over all four w’s is with 43.3% higher than for ﬁrst mover data (30%). Including those
subjects who only confronted three different w’s the share of w-invariant patterns is even
63.3%(= 43.3% + 20%).
For 7 subjects we could not identify a stable (or monotonically increasing) pattern in
median behavior over the ﬁrst 20 rounds. No such case occurred for data of the last 20
rounds. Neither over all rounds nor over the last 20 rounds, there is a subject with a median
demand pattern that increases monotonically with decreasing probability w, as predicted by
the risk-dominant solution.
Observation 2. The behavior of uninformed second movers can be summarized as follows:
(i) Demands of uninformed second movers (weakly) decrease with the probability w of the
ultimatum mode. However, demands do hardly react to small levels of w.
(ii) Demanding 50 is focal and 43% (63%) of all subjects have w-invariant median demands
over all w’s (over those values of w they confronted).
(iii) On average, uninformed second movers demand more than their risk-dominant solution
demand in all treatment conditions. This deviation is larger the higher the probability of
the ultimatum mode.
4.4. Analysis of informed second-mover behavior
We ﬁnally analyze the behavior of informed second movers who were aware of demand
x of ﬁrst movers (U-mode). As can be seen in Table 1, all but one demand was accepted
by informed second movers in case of w = 0.1 and w = 0.3.19 By and large this is due to
the fact that ﬁrst movers proposed the equal split (x = 50) in these cases. Therefore, in all
informed second mover regressions in Table 6 acceptance for both w = 0.1 and w = 0.3i s
Table 6 Results of informed second-mover regressions
Regression Regression Regression
ISM1 ISM2 ISM3
α9 (D9)0 .687 0.191 0.308
(0.618) (0.678) (0.704)
α7 (D7)0 .728 0.631 0.904
(0.620) (0.683) (0.718)
γ (x jt)0 .262∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.025) (0.027)
β9 (D9 × t)0 .013∗ 0.010
(0.007) (0.008)




Adj. pseudo R2 0.693 0.697 0.717
Note: Standard errors of estimators in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗∗p <. 01.
19 The only exception is a rejected demand of x = 57 in treatment condition w = 0.3.
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the reference point. Note that 64% (47%) of ﬁrst-mover demands exceeded x = 50 in case
of w = 0.9( w = 0.7). Table 6 shows the results of several ﬁxed-effects probit regressions
of rejection behavior of informed second movers. The underlying model of regression ISM3
for example is:
Prob[Rejectit = 1] = F(α9D9 + α7D7 + γx jt + β9(D9 × t) + β7(D7 × t)
+δcConﬂictt−1 + αi)
where Rejectit equals one if second mover i rejected the offer yit = 100 − x jt of ﬁrst mover
j in period t; and αi is the subject speciﬁc effect to be estimated. All other variables are
deﬁned as in equation (1) and as in all binary probit regressions the underlying distribution
is the standard normal.20
All demands by ﬁrst movers in treatment conditions w = 0.7 and w = 0.9 were smaller
than 100. Thus, subgame perfection predicts that all demands should be accepted suggesting
the null hypothesis γ = 0. If, however, higher demands by ﬁrst movers are rejected more
often, we expect γ>0. In all models in Table 6, the coefﬁcient γ is signiﬁcantly greater
than 0, meaning that higher demands are rejected more often. Given the evidence reported
in the vast literature on the ultimatum game this result is of course not surprising.
Inallthreeregressionscoefﬁcientsα9 andα7 areinsigniﬁcant(andinsigniﬁcantlydifferent
from another), i.e. an identical offer is not more acceptable for w = 0.9 than for w = 0.7o r
0.3/0.1. Finally, we can not reject that there are no time effects (at p < 5%) and again we do
not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant inﬂuence of variable Conﬂictt−1.
Observation 3. The behavior of informed second movers can be summarized as follows:
(i) Rejectionbehaviorismainlydrivenbyﬁrst-moverdemands.Higherdemands(orsmaller
offers) by ﬁrst movers are more likely rejected.
(ii) There are no signiﬁcant direct effects of treatment probability w on rejection behavior.
(iii) Rejection behavior is stable across rounds.
5. Discussion
Theresultsofourexperimentsshowthatﬁrstmoversanduninformedsecondmovers(weakly)
react to the control variable w as predicted. For the three higher levels of w we observe
statistically signiﬁcant differences in demands. Furthermore, for the highest level of w given
in the experiment (w = 0.9) our results resemble stylized facts about behavior in ultimatum
games: Informed second movers frequently reject payoff shares of 1/3 and even above.
(The average rejected offer is 33.45). First mover demands are concentrated in the range
1/2 ≤ x ≤ 3/4 of relative demands with the equal split 1/2 being modal. The frequency of
equal split demands is higher the lower the value of w. For the probabilities w = 0.1 and
w = 0.3themediandemandofallﬁrstmoversandofover90%ofsecondmoversistheequal
split.Individualdemandsonlybecomemoredispersedforhighprobabilitiesw (w = 0.7and
w = 0.9).
20 All coefﬁcients including the 30 subject effects were estimated by maximizing the unconditional log like-
lihood using Newton’s iteration method.
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Although mean demands vary with probability w, median demands of about 30% of
all ﬁrst movers and of more than 40% of uninformed second movers are invariant over all
four w’s. Most ﬁrst and uninformed second movers who do not show w-invariance in their
medians,onlyhavetwodifferentmediandemandsforallfourlevelsofw,i.e.,theydemanded
the equal split for low probabilities w and adjusted their demand only once. This suggests
that for relatively high levels of w, participants treat w-games like an ultimatum game and
for relatively low levels of w like a Nash demand game.
Parallel to ﬁndings in market experiments with errors in communication (see G¨ uth et al.,
2001) we observe that for a high probability w, ﬁrst movers enjoy a ﬁrst-mover advantage.
However, this ﬁrst-mover advantage is not as strong as predicted by theory. Nevertheless it
is statistically signiﬁcant although with repeated interaction demands become increasingly
invariant with respect to w. A possible reason for this is that from the very beginning of the
experiment second movers reject considerable offers in the U–mode and appear to insist on
the equal split in the N–mode. Conﬂict and rejection rates increase with w. Though demands
adjust with experience the effect is considerably stronger for ﬁrst-mover demands.
Altogether, like in other pie-sharing experiments we observe a strong focus on the equal
split. The signiﬁcant effects regarding our control variable w rely on a rather small fraction
of subjects reacting to the probability of revelation, but over time they also learned and were
taught to play fair.
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
Let us consider two different strict equilibria of the N-truncation: (x, y) and (˜ x, ˜ y) with
x, y, ˜ x, ˜ y > 0, x + y = ˜ x + ˜ y = p, x  = ˜ x and thus y  = ˜ y. The 2 × 2–bimatrix game
y ˜ y
x x, y wx,w(p − x)
˜ x ˜ x,w(p − ˜ x) + (1 − w)y ˜ x, ˜ y
(2)
istheminimalformation21spannedby(x, y)and(˜ x, ˜ y)forx > ˜ x.Forallw ∈ [0,1],strictness
of(x, y)and(˜ x, ˜ y)impliesthattheyarealsostrictequilibriaofthisbimatrixgame.Riskdom-
inance for 2x2–bimatrix games with two strict equilibria is axiomatically characterized by
 invariance with respect to isomorphic transformations,
 best reply invariance,
 monotonicity.
A best reply preserving transformation of bimatrix in (2) is22:
y ˜ y
x x − ˜ x,(1 − w)y 0,0
˜ x 0,0 ˜ x − wx,(1 − w)(˜ y − y)
21 A formation is a substructure which results from excluding strategies and which is closed with respect to
the best reply correspondence in the original game. It is minimal if it contains no proper subformation.
22 Best reply-preserving transformation in detail: ux(x, y) − ux(˜ x, y) = x − ˜ x, respectively ux(˜ x, ˜ y) −
ux(x, ˜ y) = ˜ x − wx and uy(x, y) − uy(x, ˜ y) = y − w(p − x) = y − wy, respectively uy(˜ x, ˜ y) − uy(˜ x, y) =
˜ y − w(p − ˜ x) − (1 − w)y = (1 − w)(˜ y − y).
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˜ x 0,0 1,
˜ y−y
y
Invariance with respect to isomorphisms and best reply–preserving transformations implies
that neither (x, y) risk dominates (˜ x, ˜ y) nor vice versa whenever
x − ˜ x
˜ x − wx
=
˜ y − y
y
Thus monotonicity24 implies that (x, y) risk dominates (˜ x, ˜ y) for
x − ˜ x
˜ x − wx
>
x − ˜ x
p − x
Rearranging and substituting ˜ y by p − ˜ x and y by p − x yields
x + ˜ x − p
˜ x
<w (3)
Due to the symmetry properties between the formation spanned by (x, y) and (˜ x, ˜ y) for
x > ˜ x and that for x < ˜ x, one obtains a similar result for the latter case. For x < ˜ x,( x, y)
risk dominates (˜ x, ˜ y)i f
˜ x + x − p
x
>w (4)
Nowfor x = x∗(w)where x∗(w) = p/(2 − w),condition(3)isequivalentto ˜ x < x∗(w)and
condition (4) to ˜ x > x∗(w) proving that the strict equilibrium corresponding to x∗(w) risk
dominates all other strict equilibria of the N-truncation. Thus x∗(w) is the solution demand
for all w ∈ [0,1], what proves Proposition 1.
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